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ABSTRACT
This paper aims to shed some light on the difficulties we face in constructing a
generally acceptable normative framework for thinking about public health. It
argues that there are three factors which combine to make theorising about public
health difficult, and which when taken together defeat simplistic top-down and
2bottom-up approaches to the design of public health policies.
The first factor is the problem of complex systems, namely that the distribution
of health both affects and is affected by the distribution of other goods. The
second is the difficulty of defining the goals of public health: we still need to get
clear about what we should mean by health in this context, and what the goals of
public health should be. The third is that we stand in need of an account of how
important health is relative to the importance of other goods which a just society
should be trying to secure for its citizens.
The paper argues that these problems should lead us to abandon the search for
a ‘one-size fits all’ normative framework for thinking about public health. Rather,
different approaches will be appropriate at different levels of abstraction.
INTRODUCTION
It is generally agreed that we still stand in need of an appropriate normative
framework for addressing the ethical problems which arise in the design and
implementation of public health policies. This makes the perceived situation in
public health ethics rather different from the perceived situation in conventional
bioethics, where a combination of Beauchamp and Childress’s four principles,
Mill’s harm principle, and Parfit’s thinking on nonidentity are taken to comprise a
widely accepted paradigm within which many staple topics such as euthanasia,
abortion and enhancement can fruitfully be addressed.1 This paper aims to make
some modest progress towards such a framework for normative thinking about
1 I argue below that this confidence in the normative framework of bioethics is at least partially
misplaced. Insofar as bioethics aims to guide public policy, it faces the same three problems we
shall identify for normative thinking about public health.
3public health. It aims only for modest progress, because its chief aim is to get
clear about precisely which elements of public health make it difficult to theorise,
and why.
The underlying question which this article examines is the appropriate
relationship between abstract philosophical thinking about public health, and
public health practice. It is easy for philosophers to think that something like a
top-down approach will suffice.2 On such a view, philosophers and
philosophically minded ethicists reason out the appropriate goals of public health
practice and the acceptable limits of state intervention in health promotion
through a mixture of normative argument and conceptual analysis, and public
health professionals then conform their actions to these policies. It is tempting for
public health practitioners, from their more engaged perspective, to think that a
bottom-up approach will suffice. On such a view the real work is to be done on
the ground, and all the conceptual and ethical issues which philosophers might
raise are peripheral to how the practice of public health should go on.
This article reveals along the way the distinctive weaknesses of top-down and
bottom-up approaches to public health. I shall argue that there is no way to
perform the easy division of labour between theorisation and implementation
which the top-down approach presupposes, and that it is false to think, as the
2 By a top-down approach, I mean roughly what Caplan defined as the ‘engineering model’ of
applied ethics, namely one which presumes that “(1) there is a body of knowledge concerning
ethics that persons can be more or less knowledgeable about; (2) this knowledge becomes
‘applied’ in medical settings by: (a) deducing conclusions from theories in light of relevant
empirical facts and descriptions of circumstances and (b) analyzing properly the process of the
deduction (i.e., watching for logical fallacies, ambiguities in the meaning of key terms,
improper classifications of entities, misdescriptions, etc.); and (3) the process of applying
ethical knowledge to moral problems in medicine can and must be carried out in an impartial,
disinterested, value-free manner.” (Caplan 1983, p. 314)
4bottom-up approach presupposes, that public health policy can do without explicit
and rigorous philosophical theorising. However my main aim is not to argue for
the inadequacy of either of these models (which I think would not be a very
challenging task), but to get a greater understanding of the problems involved in
integrating more philosophical and more policy oriented perspectives in public
health.
I argue that there are three important complications which we need to take into
account when thinking about our normative framework for public health. The first
difficulty is one which particularly affects attempts to go from philosophical
ethical theorising into practicable and defensible policy. I call this the problem of
complex systems, namely that the distribution of health both affects and is
affected by the distribution of other goods. These interactions are not just
complicated, they are complex: they outwit (and can be expected to continue to
outwit) our best attempts to understand the minutiae of the relevant causal
interactions. (Edwards, 2004, p.16) This creates a problem for top-down
approaches to public health policy making, in as much as it will always for the
foreseeable future be very difficult (if not impossible) to set and then implement
policy in a way which reliably leads to things turning out as we envisage that they
will, and attempts will to do so will tend to be subject to unintended adverse
consequences.
The second and third problems will particularly affect bottom-up attempts to
construct public health policy without drawing on deep and systematic normative
reflection. The second problem is the problem of the limits and goals of public
5health. It seems intuitively obvious that the main purpose of public health policy
should be to improve and protect the health of the population. However, it is far
less obvious what we should take health to be in this context, and different
answers will make important differences in how we view the goals of public
health. Moreover, it is unclear whether the goals of public health activity ought to
be simply to maximise population health, or should also include health equity and
personal choice.
The third problem is the problem of the relative importance of health. I argue
that health looks to be at best one ultimate good amongst several which societies
should be pursuing; and it is not always the case that a policy which will further
the goals of public health will also be in concert with other ultimate goals we will
have as a society. In other words, we face a tough indexing problem of how to
tradeoff between goals which are apparently at least partially incommensurable.
Given the causal entanglement of health and other goods and the broader problem
of complex systems, it does not make sense to try to set public health goals
without reference to a larger framework in which we relate the value of health to
the value of other goals that a society wishes to pursue.
Given the great complexity introduced into the normative regulation of public
health by each of these three problems, the conclusion reached in the paper about
the appropriate normative framework for thinking about public health is fairly
tentative. The main conclusion reached is that whilst public health policy needs to
address all of these problems, the kind of desiderata we have for solving the
second two problems are dissimilar to those for solving the first. It follows that it
6is unrealistic to think that we will be able to construct a ‘one-size fits all’
normative framework for thinking about public health. Rather, we will do better to
think in terms of what the best approach to a given problem in public health is for
a given level of abstraction.
At the highest level of abstraction, the proper goals of public health activity
should be closely circumscribed by what turns out to be the best theory of justice.
I argue that health will be at best one good amongst others in our best account of
justice: we should adopt a pluralistic account of justice as our normative
framework for thinking about public health. However, when we approach closer
to the real world and want to adopt a less abstract framework, there can and will
be good reasons for framing the proper goals of public health activity in different
terms; not so much in terms of the application of an overall theory of justice, but
rather through a series of more contextual decisions about how best to proceed
given the circumstances.
NORMATIVE THEORISING AND THE PROBLEM
OF COMPLEX SYSTEMS
The problem of complex systems is one which is endemic to any endeavour to
reform institutions, though it is one which is particularly problematic for public
health interventions. In short, any attempt to change the way that an institution
operates will tend to have effects on other aspects of the way this institution
operates; and it will also tend to have spreading and somewhat unpredictable
effects on the way that other institutions operate. To put the problem in a slightly
7different way, large institutions, such as a nationalised healthcare system, are not
merely complicated, but also complex systems: it is not just that they are
comprised of many parts, but also that they are comprised of parts whose
interactions make a large difference to how the system as a whole operates.
Moreover, these interactions between the parts do not tend to be additive: rather
we also see complex positive and negative feedback loops. A set of new ideas,
such as those which we now call Evidence Based Medicine, may start in a small
group, then spread to a hospital, and then colonise much of medical education.
Other ideas and theories, perhaps no less intrinsically helpful encounter initial
turbulence, and are snuffed out.
Chapman (2004) argues plausibly that we will tend to see three large problems
if we treat a complex system such as the UK’s National Health Service as being
amenable to a top-down engineering model of reform. First, we will tend to find
that many of our reforms have unintended consequences: we will apply a reform
which is intended to have one effect, but we will find that, whether it achieves its
intended target or not, it also has unintended side effects.3 The second problem
follows on from the first: top-down attempts to reform complex systems will tend
to alienate professionals who work inside these institutions, because, given the
impossibility of constructing a plan which will require sensible things in all cases,
it will require the professionals to sometimes or perhaps regularly work according
to goals or targets which they believe to be wrong or mistaken. For instance, a
3 The most well-known of such unintended side-effects in reform of institutions is probably the
effect of setting multiple and specific targets, for instance which will tend to create incentives
to meet and to prioritise the targets, and thus sideline other goals which are also important.
8doctor may be required to spend less time with a patient than she thinks necessary,
because she has been instructed to see a certain number of patients per hour.
Third, we can expect such reforms to fail to improve standards over time: the
failures to achieve intended aims, and the need to counteract the unintended
consequences of previous reforms, will lead to a perceived need for further
reform, “following in the trail of events like a boxer who covers the body part that
has just been hit only to get hit somewhere else.” (Demosthenes, 4th Century
BCE) This continual reform will of course only tend to heighten the sense of
alienation felt by professionals, and will tend to add to this alienation a sense of
confusion and reform fatigue.4
The Inadequacy of Bioethicists’ Attempts to Address the
Problem of Complex Systems
Insofar as bioethicists attempt to address questions of institutional reform – which
they clearly are when for example, they address questions like whether we should
enact an ‘ethical market’ in organs, or whether we should allow commercial
surrogacy – they ought to take the problem of complex systems into account.
However, bioethicists have thus far shown a rather disappointing lack of
willingness to engage with this problem, and it would scarcely be an exaggeration
to say that much of philosophical bioethics proceeds as if this problem did not
4 See for example, Sennett (2008, p.50): “Any organisational reform takes time to ‘bed in’;
people have to learn how to put the changes into practice – whom now to call, which forms to
use, what forms to follow. If a patient is having a heart attack, you do not want to reach for
your ‘Manual of Best-Practice Performances’ to discover the latest rules about what you are
supposed to do. The process of bedding in takes longer the bigger and more complex the
organization in which one works.”
9exist.5
There are two chief methods by which bioethicists attempt to skirt around the
problem of complex systems. The first way is focusing on the moral quality of the
action which will be either encouraged or discouraged, enabled or banned by the
proposed reform, and assuming that the appropriate reaction to the actual
implementation of the reform can be somehow read off from the moral quality of
the actions involved. In certain cases, where there are strong reasons for thinking
that an activity is morally impermissible, considered in itself, then it may be
reasonable to take this impermissibility as giving us sufficient reason to oppose
any policy which allows it. For instance, were we faced with a wrong as egregious
as that of slavery, it might be claimed that there would be little point in worrying
about the internal workings of institutions: we should simply get rid of slavery.
And it might also be added that it will also be useful to know whether the activity
in question is morally impermissible, as this will typically alter the way we
interpret any apparent benefits which directly follow from the activity.6
Be that as it may, it is important to note that even in cases where an activity is
uncontroversially morally wrong (such as racial discrimination) we will still face
the problem of complex systems in trying to dismantle it; and unless we
understand, and factor into our account, the ways in which such oppressive
5 I take it that public health ethics is sufficiently new that it would be unfair to make sweeping
claims of this kind about it. My point here is that in working out a normative framework for
public health ethics, it is important that writers in public health ethics not to make the mistake
of thinking that they can draw on the needed accounts of institutional reform from the literature
of bioethics.
6 For example, if a torturer gets pleasure out of his work, this should not count in favour of a
policy which allows torture.
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institutions are maintained and supported, our attempts at reform are likely to be
at best partially successful.
Where the conclusion of a bioethical argument is that an action is, considered
in itself permissible, then it is even more difficult to evade the problem of
complex systems. Where several different actions or reforms are permissible, it is
vital to include the systemic effects of each of the potential reforms in our analysis
of which policy we should favour. Depending on the bioethicist’s moral
orientation, more or less actions will be able to be ruled out as impermissible in
themselves, and if the bioethicist’s overall orientation is consequentialist, then all
actions will be, considered in themselves permissible. Hence, consequentialist
approaches will be especially prey to the problem of complex systems. (Lenman,
2000) Given that neither knowing that an action is impermissible nor that it is
permissible will give us enough information to decide on what policy we should
adopt, it follows that merely examining the permissibility or otherwise of actions
considered in themselves, is very limited as a basis for thinking about the reform
of institutions.7
Perhaps because of a vague awareness of this problem, when bioethicists wish
to make public policy recommendations, very often they supplement the focus on
moral permissibility with an appeal to one or more ‘bridging principles’, in order
to generate public policy recommendations.8 I call this the second strategy. Such
7 None of this is to deny that arguing about whether a given activity is permissible, considered in
itself, is not worth doing. It is rather that knowing that something is permissible does not tell us
enough to realise whether, given our current situation, and the other institutions which are in
operation, we should reform things in this way rather than a different way.
8 I have borrowed the term ‘bridging principle’ in this context from Habermas, but have
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‘bridging principles’ include the principle of least restrictive alternative, the
precautionary principle and (as it is frequently used in bioethics) Rawls’s
difference principle. In perhaps the most common incarnation of this strategy,
Mill’s ‘harm principle’9 is used as a way of getting from philosophical judgements
about harm and permissibility to public policy in the following way:
1. We should criminalise an activity only if it involves harm to those other
than those who are involved in it and consent to it. (The harm principle)
2. Doing X (e.g. allowing sales of kidneys; allowing genetic enhancement)
does not involve any harms to people other than consenting adults.
3. Therefore X should be legal.
However it is far from clear whether (and if so how) such bridging principles
can solve the problem of complex systems. Are they supposed to be sound in
virtue of their consequences, such that judging in accordance with the bridging
principle can give us a short cut through the difficulties of reforming complex
systems? If so, we would expect rather more empirical evidence than we typically
see as to why this bridging principle really does allow us to cut through the
immensely difficult task of reforming complex institutions. Or if they are
transformed it somewhat in the process. See for example Habermas 1990, p.63: “In theoretical
discourse the gap between observations and general hypotheses is bridged by some canon or
other of induction. An analogous bridging principle is needed for practical discourse.
Accordingly, all studies of the logic of moral argumentation end up having to introduce a moral
principle as a rule of argumentation that has a function equivalent to the principle of induction
in the discourse of the empirical sciences.”
9 “The sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively in interfering with
the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which
power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will,
is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant.” (Mill, 1861)
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supposed to be sound for some other morally relevant reason than their
consequences, one would again expect to see rather more moral argument in their
favour than appears to be usual.10
In addition to such bridging principles, bioethicists also typically rely (often
largely implicitly) on a philosophical anthropology: assumptions about human
nature are fed in, in order to license what remain largely intuitive predictions
about what would happen if a particular piece of reform were enacted. Because
such philosophical anthropologies are usually kept implicit, we often see wildly
different estimates about what the actual effects – both direct and indirect – of a
given reform will be. A good example is provided by the debate on whether
legalising euthanasia does or would lead to a slippery slope. (Lewis 2007).
Public Health and the Problem of Complex Systems
I take it therefore that the general problem we have uncovered relates to all
attempts to reform institutions; and thus to the extent that traditional bioethics
takes itself to be interested in the reform of institutions, it is a failing of bioethics
that so little thought has thus far been addressed to it.
The problem of complex systems is even more vital to address in public health
ethics, for two reasons. First, because public health interventions are classically
oriented at a population level rather than an individual level, the core of public
health interventions is creating and reforming institutional structures in such a
10 Unthinking application of such bridging principles is of course particularly problematic in the
case of public health ethics, where what has usually been taken to be legitimate public health
activity can often be taken to fall foul of the limitations on legitimate state action that Mill’s
harm principle would seem to recommend.
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way as to improve population health.
Second, we now have solid evidence that a vast array of different factors about
the makeup of the basic institutions of society pervasively affect population
health.11 We cannot improve population health without engaging deeply with the
structures of these other institutions and the different ways they impact on health.
Just to give one small example, (and of course, part of my point is that there will
be lots of other interactions which we either do not know about yet, or which will
interact unpredictably with one another), our transport and urban policy will have
a great impact on health. If we encourage car use, then more people will end up
obese than if we encourage cycling and walking. Hence things like the ways we
design our towns (whether we place shopping centres out of the centre of town, so
that it is very inconvenient to shop unless you have a car), can make a big
difference to population health. On the other hand, the way we regulate the
distribution of health pervasively affects the distribution of other goods. When
people do not have a certain modicum of health, they are unable to work, and are
thus deprived of access to other important goods (e.g. work, play, pain free
existence).
An additional problem which normative thinking about public health will need
to come to terms with is that the typical structure of government departments
creates another layer of difficulty in constructing an effective public health policy.
Even if we were in a position to understand all (or enough of) the relevant causal
pathways, health ministries are not typically in a position to ensure that the
11 Out of a massive literature, see for example, Wilkinson and Marmot (2003), CSDH (2008).
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required changes are implemented in sectors such as transport, employment and
education, which are usually the responsibility of different government
departments. Where we need different bits of government working together in
order to ensure a particular result for health, then the typical structure of
government departments, which tend to be in competition with one another for
resources and prestige make this difficult to achieve, and it is very likely that
another department’s policy may end up undermining what we would like to
achieve from a public health perspective.
The problem of complex systems thus presents a serious challenge to any form
of abstract theorising about public health which is not grounded in an
understanding of factors which impede or accelerate our attempts at reform. In
short, unless we can factor in a sufficient understanding of the inner wiring of the
complex systems we are trying to reform, our attempts as philosophers to suggest
how institutions should be reformed will either be dismissed as unworkable by
those who are responsible for delivering services on the ground – or perhaps
worse! - they may be implemented, and cause the unintended consequences and
alienation of professionals which we saw are the likely results of top-down
attempts to reform complex institutions. I shall suggest later that the solution to
this problem depends crucially on the level of abstraction at which we are
working: insofar as we are interested in largely conceptual issues, then the
problem need not affect us; but if we are interested in actually improving people’s
lives then it is of vital importance that we take it into account.
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THE LIMITS AND GOALS OF PUBLIC HEALTH
An underlying theme of this section and the next is that despite the limitations on
the power of normative thinking revealed by the problem of complex systems,
significant, rigorous and abstract philosophical work is necessary for any
acceptable normative framework for public health policy. This section examines
two perplexities about the limits and goals of public health, whilst the next section
examines the relative importance of health as compared to other goods which
governments should be trying to promote.
There are two distinct ways in which the phrase ‘public health’ is used. First to
denote the health states of a particular population (so that we might say that, for
instance, a high incidence of smoking in a population is bad for public health).
Second, public health is often used to mean the activities we collectively
undertake to ensure that the health of the population is protected and promoted.
(Verweij and Dawson, 2007) I shall refer to the first as population health, and the
second as public health. It is public health in this second sense that is our focus in
this article.
Public health is classically concerned with interventions that are collective in
two senses: they involve the concerted action of a number of people or institutions
in order to bring them about; and second, they aim to improve health at a group or
population level, as opposed to an individual level. Given the doubly collective
nature of public health interventions, there will be various ways in which
individuals can intervene to improve their own health or the health of others
which do not amount to public health interventions. Ordinary clinical medicine, in
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which one (or a number) of health care professionals are aiming to benefit a single
patient, does not count as public health; nor would a particular individual’s
decision to stop smoking: though of course the broader decision as to whether or
not to have a National Health Service, or a campaign to promote smoking
cessation would.12
Given what I have just said about the problem of complex systems, it is
important to notice that there is a potential ambiguity in the idea of interventions
which improve population health. Such interventions could either have
improvement of population health as their aim, or they could improve population
health by accident or as a by-product of the pursuit of another goal. For instance,
it seems very likely that if we were to flatten inequalities in income between
groups by for instance increasing top rates of tax and raising the guaranteed
income of every household, then this would also reduce health inequalities, and
increase average life expectancy.13 If a government were to undertake such
redistribution for the purposes of changing the distribution of health, then this
would clearly count as a public health intervention. However, if a government
were to undertake this redistribution in ignorance of the effects that it would have
on health, or were solely interested in the effects on income inequality and did not
care about health inequality, then we should not describe what the government did
as a public health intervention, but rather an intervention which happened to have
a beneficial effect on population health. Our focus here is with interventions
12 As a moment’s thought about these two examples suggests, the boundaries between public
health activities and private health activities will typically be somewhat porous, and it may
ultimately be better to think in terms of a continuum than a bright light between the two. I shall
leave these problems of the delineation of public health on one side here.
13 See for example, Wilkinson and Pickett (2006).
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which aim to improve population health.
Understanding public health activity as interventions which aim to improve the
health of the population leaves open two deep questions. First, what should we
take health to be in this context? And second, how should we understand the goals
of public activity: are they merely to maximise population health, or should they
also include distributive questions (and hence take in issues about inequalities in
health), and issues about respect for autonomy?
Defining Health
The definition of health matters deeply for public health activity. Depending on
how we define health, the field of public health will be correspondingly broader or
narrower, and it will be more or less difficult to explain why public health should
be a priority.
Health is such a multivalent concept that there are various different ways in
which we can categorise accounts of it. For our purposes we can rely on a fairly
standard categorisation, according to which we analyse accounts of health
according to whether (a) the judgement that someone is or is not healthy
essentially depends on scientifically verifiable claims about their functioning as an
organic system, and (b) whether the judgement that someone is or is not healthy
essentially depends on certain evaluative claims about the state of affairs in
question.
Categorising in this way gives us three kinds of accounts of health. First,
purely non-evaluative accounts, which argue that we should define what counts as
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healthy in a purely scientific way, without drawing on evaluative claims at all.
Second, purely evaluative accounts, which argue that there are no factual
constraints about what can and cannot count as unhealthy, and that the only thing
common between cases of ill health is that all are disvalued. Third, there are
combined (or hybrid) accounts, according to which our account of health should
be grounded in a scientific account of functioning and an account of value.
(Murphy 2008)
I wish to make the relatively modest claim that anything like public health
activity as we currently conceive of it presupposes a combined account. This is
because if we define health in a non-evaluative way (as in such as Boorse 1975
and 1997), then it becomes rather difficult to see why it should be that we should
take health to be an important goal in and of itself for government action.
Certainly it cannot be that health is important for its own sake; rather it must at
best be because of the enabling role that health plays for other goods. However, if
health plays merely an enabling role, then it looks like our focus (from the
perspective of ethics and justice) should be on the provision of these other goods
which are really important in themselves, and public health policy has at best a
derivative importance. This is not to argue that such definitions of health are
wrong, but merely to point out that they are difficult to reconcile with the type of
importance which public health practitioners usually wish to place on health.
Purely evaluative accounts of health also conflict with the classical conception
of public health activity, though for a different reason. On purely evaluative
accounts of health (such as Reznek 1987, Cooper 2002) there are no hard
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biological facts of the matter about which states constitute health and disease;
disease states are simply states which are disvalued by societies.14 On such views,
there is no essence to health. This risks making the equal and opposite problem for
public health activity. If there is no essence to health, and any mental or bodily
state which a society disvalues could be defined as one of ill health, then it
becomes deeply unclear why we should take public health seriously as an activity;
why not have activity aimed at relieving whatever the sources of disvalue are?
I take it from this that any account of public health ethics which wishes to
preserve the idea of public health activity as distinctively and separately important
will need to presuppose a definition of health which combines both an account of
disease as involving some kind of dysfunction, and the evaluative claim that there
is some specific type of disvalue associated with this dysfunction for the people
who have it.
The goals of public health
As Munthe (2008) argues, the traditional goal of public health was merely to
improve population health, measured for example by average life expectancy. The
potential problem with this is that merely looking at averages hides potentially
normatively problematic variations within the distribution of health. Since the
14 Cooper’s view is somewhat more nuanced than many purely evaluative accounts of disease. On
Cooper’s account, by disease “we mean a condition that it is a bad thing to have, that is such
that we consider the afflicted person to have been unlucky, and that can potentially be
medically treated.” (2002, p. 271) Without the third clause, it would not be possible to
distinguish ill-health from other ways in which a person might fall short of full well being.
Hence the definition needs to specify “what is distinctively medical about the conditions that
we expect medical personnel to treat” (Murphy 2008). However it seems compellingly difficult
to do so in a way which does not already invoke the concept of disease, and it does not seem
that Cooper or any other theorist of disease as purely evaluative has succeeded in this.
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Black Report in 1980, we have become increasingly aware of the extent to which
there are inequalities in health, and the fact that these inequalities fall on people
who are already disadvantaged for other reasons.15 Because of this, many public
health practitioners have found it plausible to introduce a second goal as a key one
for public health, namely a reduction in health inequalities. More recently, a third
potential goal for public health has appeared on the horizon: namely health related
autonomy. The point here is simple: health is only one among many goods, and it
is legitimate for citizens in a liberal society to choose to value other goods above
their health if they so desire. (For instance, someone might well prefer to drink a
bottle of wine per day with its attendant health disadvantages, to a more
abstemious intake.) Because of this factor of personal choice, it becomes apparent
that perhaps the goal of public health activity should be not to promote health per
se, but to provide the conditions under which people can freely choose to be
healthy if they so desire.16
Both equality and the freedom for each citizen to pursue their own conception
of the good are compellingly important goals from the perspective of what we
think justice, and hence governments as a whole, should be aiming at. The key
question for public health is whether we should consider equality in health, and
personal freedom to be internal and constitutive constraints on the goals of public
health, or whether the values of equality and autonomy should be thought of as
15 Department of Health and Social Security (1980). See also Marmot 2004 and Wilkinson 1996.
16 Of course, where public health policy has as its focus children and non-competent adults, or
choices in adults which tend to be less autonomous such as those concerning food and alcohol,
such a ‘choice-centred’ view of public health is markedly less attractive. In the case of
children, few will doubt that public health policy should aim simply at health rather than at the
freedom to be healthy.
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external constraints on public health activity. It is not clear to me what is at stake
practically here; but, as we cross over to the third problem – the importance of
health relative to other goods which a society should be aiming at – we shall
notice that there is a theoretical benefit to thinking of them as internal constraints,
in so far as we will ultimately need to provide an integrated account of justice
which takes into account how health’s value is related to the value of other goods.
Having an account of the goals of public health which already incorporates the
core values of our overall theory of justice as constituent parts will make this
work of integration less difficult. (Munthe 2008)
THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF HEALTH
It is vital for normative work on public health to focus on the relative importance
of health – that is the importance that health has relative to other goods which a
society should be aiming to promote or protect – for two reasons. First, resources
which are devoted to the goals of public health cannot be devoted to the pursuit of
other goals, and it is important that as a society we should be placing our
resources in a position to best meet whatever our goals should be.
Second, we remarked earlier on the way in which health is causally entangled
with other goods. Hence policies which we would like to pursue in order to
promote other goods (such as liberty) will tend to have effects (both positive and
negative) on health, and policies which we enact to promote the goals of public
health will often have effects (both positive and negative) on the distribution of
other non-health goods. Where we have reason to believe that the complex causal
relationships are likely to rebound in a way which is favourable (where for
22
example, improving women’s education and literacy has many other benefits
including increased health equality), then this may not be an important practical
problem. However, there are cases where goals we might wish to attain in health
will conflict with other goals. In such cases we face a choice between these two
rival goods, and hence it will be important to work out how important health is
relative to the other goods in play.
Questions about the relative weights societies should give to different goods -
which goods should be seen as important for their own sake, and which goods of
only derivative importance from a policy perspective - are questions about justice.
Hence finding a suitable normative framework for thinking about public health
ethics and policy requires us, in the end to work out which account of justice we
should prefer, and the importance that health should have in this account of
justice.17
There are three basic types of answers to the value of health relative to other
goods. First, we could have an approach to government which either made health
the only good, or lexically prior to any other good. However, this seems very
implausible as an account of justice. For there seem to be goods which are
important to a just society which are neither reducible to fair distribution of health
achievement, nor valued only for their contribution to fair distribution of health
achievement. For example, it would seem strange to describe a society which was
rife with racism and discrimination, and prevented women from voting or from
holding political office, but yet where fortuitously everyone had the same level of
17 I have written about this problem at greater length in Wilson 2009a and 2009b. The next few
paragraphs draw on the analysis given there.
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health achievement as one which was just. Nor is it much more plausible to claim
that health is the most important good that a just society should be aiming at. For
this would seem to turn our commitment to health into a ‘bottomless pit’, as there
will always be further interventions we could make which would marginally
improve health, which would have to be bought at the cost of our commitment to
goods other than health.18 (Dworkin 2000, p.309)
A second possibility would be to argue that health should not be an ultimate
goal for governments at all; it might be that it is another good or goods (such as
opportunity for welfare, or liberty, or well being) which really matter, and that
health is important only insofar as it impacts on these. As I indicated earlier,
certain conceptions of health will make this view more plausible than others. If we
adopt a purely non-evaluative account, according to which the claim that someone
is unhealthy implies no normative claim, then it will of course be plausible to
think that the real normative work about determining the proper goals of society
must be done elsewhere. I shall not argue against this possibility here, but shall
simply point out that the viability of public health ethics as a branch of ethics, and
public health as a set of activities seems to presuppose the contrary: namely that
health is important for its own sake as a good and as a goal for government action.
A third possibility would be a pluralistic approach, in which more than one
good was deemed a suitable goal of government policy, and health was one of
18 The World Health Organisation (WHO) definition of health, namely that health is ‘is a state of
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or
infirmity’ makes it less implausible to think that health so defined could be the most important
good for a just society to focus on. However this is due to the fact the definition of health is
simply too all-encompassing to be useful as a definition of health. (For the debate on the WHO
definition of health, see further Callahan 1973 and Bok 2004)
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these. Pluralistic approaches to government action, as I shall use the term here are
defined by the fact that (a) they take more than one good to be a goal of
government activity for its own sake, and (b) these goods are at least partially
incommensurable.
Partial incommensurability is defined as a lack of full compensability. If two
goods are fully commensurable, then it is possible (in principle) to compensate a
shortfall of one in terms of giving more of the other. For instance, ten pound notes
and five pound notes are very obviously commensurable in this sense: if you lend
me £50 composed of five tens, and I give you back ten fives, I have fully
compensated you. A good is partially incommensurable if a shortfall in it cannot
be fully compensated. (Wolff and de Shalit 2007; Hausman 2007). Wolff and de-
Shalit point out that if full commensurability about justice were true, it would
follow that any disadvantage relevant to justice could be fully rectified by
providing a suitable amount of this one currency. However, it seems
counterintuitive to suppose that this is the case; and most people are particularly
unwilling to suppose that health is fully commensurable with all other goods
which a society should be aiming at. For instance, it seems difficult to see how a
disadvantage such as a greatly increased risk of early death, or chronic ill health
could be fully compensated by more of a non-health good. (Wolff and de-Shalit
2007, pp. 21-35)
In short, public health policy faces the following normative problem. Either
health is an ultimate goal of public policy, or it is not. If it is not a suitable
ultimate goal of public policy, then we should be less concerned with public
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health, and more concerned with the distribution of those goods that do matter for
their own sake. If health is a suitable ultimate goal of public policy, then it seems
very implausible to think that it could be the only goal of public policy. There
seem to be other ultimate goals of a good society which are not reducible to health
or their effects – whether direct or indirect – on health. However, if health is but
one of many ultimate goals of public policy, and these goals are at least partially
incommensurable, then it is far from clear how we prioritise these different goals:
we will need to make tradeoffs between health and other goods, and we do not
seem to have a principled way of doing this.
This problem of incommensurability interacts with the problem of complex
systems in such a way that both problems are magnified. For we saw from our
analysis of the first problem that (a) the way which other goods are distributed
pervasively affects the distribution of health, and vice versa; and (b) we are not in
a position to see the way through the complexity of the relevant causal
connections, so we cannot with any confidence predict that a given measure to
improve health will in fact have the effects we want it to, nor that it will not have
collateral effects on the distribution of other goods. However, we can now see that
things are even more complex, as there will be disagreements at the level of how
to prioritise goals as well.
CONCLUSION: PUBLIC HEALTH AND PUBLIC
POLICY
I have discussed three ways in which public health presents difficult challenges
for normative thought. Where should we go forward from here? The best way
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forward depends on what we are trying to achieve through our normative thinking
about public health. Is our primary aim to actually usefully guide public health
policy? Or are we interested in a more abstract set of conceptual questions about
how to define health, and how to relate the value of health to the value of other
goals?
Both types of questions can be useful ones to ask; but it is important to
understand that they are different ones, and that making progress in answering one
will not automatically allow us to make progress in answering the other. This is
most obvious in the case of the more engaged question about how to guide public
health policy: clearly when we are thinking about what we in our current situation
should do to improve population health in an ethically acceptable manner, this
will not necessarily allow us to answer more abstract questions about what an
ideal public health system would be, as our current situation may be skewed and
unusual in various ways.
But perhaps less obviously, it is important to note that even if we were able to
answer these more idealised questions, this would not be sufficient for solving the
practical problem of where we should go from here. (Sen 2006) It will not be
sufficient because the ideal account of justice may not be implementable now; and
adopting a policy which presupposes rather different background conditions than
the ones which obtain may lead to much worse results than implementing a
different “second best” approach. (Pettitt and Brennan, 2005) Moreover, having a
correct answer to the more idealised question does not seem to be a necessary
condition either, as the choices we face in policy are typically comparative ones;
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out of a few different ways we could take policy, we want to know which one to
opt for, and knowing how to answer this question will not require us to know what
the best policy out of all possible policies would be. (Sen 2006)
If anything comes out of this examination, it is the need for flexibility, and the
thought that when we are thinking about public health, one size does not fit all.
Problems which are conceptually tough, and perhaps even insuperable (such as
ranking incommensurable values) can often be of only marginal relevance for
practice; and things which are conceptually simple (like reducing rates of obesity)
can be very difficult in practice.
We can approach problems in public health at different levels of abstraction. At
the highest level of abstraction, the proper goals of public health activity should
be closely circumscribed by what turns out to be the best theory of justice.
However, when we approach closer to the real world and want to adopt a less
abstract framework, there can and will be good reasons for framing the proper
goals of public health activity in different terms, and it will not usually be
appropriate to think of practical issues in public health as an exercise in applying
theories of justice. First of all, what justice overall requires is typically
controversial, and so we will not be able to look to anything like an
uncontroversial account of justice in order to reveal to ourselves what we should
do. Second, the correct solution for an ideally just society will not necessarily be
more helpful for us in our imperfect society than a rather more pragmatic
approach. Third, when we are deciding what to do in terms of public health policy,
we will not typically be in a position to alter and tweak all other parts of public
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policy. Despite what governments may claim about the need for ‘joined up
thinking’, much policy making remains confined to silos, and practical policy
making will need to be aware of this.
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